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L Abandoned Ordnance in Libya:  
 Threats to Civilians and  
 Recommended Responses
In a report released in August 2012, “Explosive Situation: Qaddafi’s Abandoned Weapons and the 
Threat to Libya’s Civilians,” researchers from Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights 
Clinic (IHRC) examined Libya’s abandoned ordnance problem and its humanitarian consequences 
for the local population.1,2 Based on field and desk research, the report documents the threats these 
weapons pose, analyzes steps to address them and offers recommendations to minimize civilian 
harm. IHRC co-published the report with the Center for Civilians in Conflict (formerly CIVIC) and the 
Center for American Progress. In this article, two of the report’s authors summarize its 2012 find-
ings and recommendations.
by Bonnie Docherty and Anna Crowe [ Harvard Law School ]
Vast quantities of abandoned ordnance have littered Libya since the end of the 2011 armed conflict.3,4 Mu-nitions, ranging from bullets and mortars to torpe-
does and surface-to-air missiles, have been scattered around 
inadequately guarded bunkers; local militias have gathered 
stockpiles in urban areas; and individual civilians have col-
lected weapons for scrap metal or souvenirs. Determining the 
scale of the problem is difficult, as Moammar Gadhafi’s regime 
acquired an arsenal worth billions of U.S. dollars.2 Moreover, 
the regime’s weapons were divided among dozens of ammuni-
tion storage areas, each containing 25–140 bunkers.5
Many experts express concern over the international pro-
liferation of these weapons, but the abandoned ordnance has 
also posed serious domestic threats to civilians. The report 
“Explosive Situation: Qaddafi’s Abandoned Weapons and the 
Threat to Libya’s Civilians” documents these dangers and ex-
amines the key activities needed to minimize them: stockpile 
management, clearance, risk education and victim assistance. 
As a foundational step, the Libyan government should create 
a coordinated and comprehensive national plan eliminating 
the “government confusion” generated by competing agencies 
and facilitating the four areas of work.5 In addition, the inter-
national community needs to provide ongoing and increased 
assistance and cooperation. The prevention of more civilian 
casualties requires urgent and immediate efforts by national 
and international entities.
Threats to Libya’s Civilians
During its field mission to Libya, Harvard Law School’s 
International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) documented 
five major threats that abandoned ordnance has posed to 
civilians.6 Each of them has the potential to lead to additional 
civilian casualties.7
Stockpile locations. The positioning of stockpiles in popu-
lated areas coupled with poor management practices have in-
creased the risk of catastrophic explosions that would cause 
significant injury and death. In March 2012 a member of the 
Military Council of Misrata, where this practice has been par-
ticularly common, estimated that in his city more than 200 
militias each held between six and 40 shipping containers full 
of weapons.8 In the same month, an explosion in Dafniya, a 
town 20 km (12 mi) from Misrata, exemplified the danger. A 
militia had stored weapons in 22 adjacent shipping contain-
ers, and a stray shot reportedly penetrated one of the con-
tainers, detonating the ammunition in a chain reaction and 
spreading explosive remnants of war (ERW) across the neigh-
borhood. A mine from the blast later killed a DanChurchAid 
deminer, and in late March the community was again using 
buildings in the affected area.9,10
Curiosity. Inquisitiveness has further endangered civil-
ians who visit contaminated sites or handle abandoned weap-
ons. Children are particularly curious and unsuspecting, and 
they have often played with munitions. A Danish Demining 
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Group manager observed that children “try to set off the anti-
aircraft missiles with nails and bricks,” and IHRC learned of 
multiple casualties resulting from such behavior.11
Harvesting weapons materials. Civilians have been killed 
or injured while harvesting scrap metal to sell or explosives 
to use for fishing. For example, a man and his two sons died 
during an explosion in the Zintan ammunition storage area 
while gathering scrap metal in December 2011. The man’s 
family later asked a MAG (Mines Advisory Group) deminer 
to clear piles of collected metal and propellant from the fam-
ily’s home.12
Community clearance. Since the conflict, abandoned and 
unexploded ordnance has contaminated homes, public build-
ings (such as schools and mosques) and farmland. Eager to 
make their communities safer, some civilians have tried clear-
ing areas without expert training or assistance, an activity 
that endangers them and exacerbates the challenges of pro-
fessional clearance.
Displays of mementos. Finally, war museums and pri-
vate individuals have put weapons on display. The museum 
in Misrata, located on the city’s main street, has exhibited 
a large collection of weapons in a relatively haphazard way. 
Demining organizations have worked to make such muse-
ums safe; however, the museums have undermined risk edu-
cation efforts by normalizing the collection of weapons and 
subsequently encouraging private displays, which deminers 
cannot monitor.
Stockpile Management
Since the end of the 2011 armed conflict, proper stockpile 
management has been sorely lacking in Libya, but good prac-
tices are essential to minimizing the threats of abandoned 
ordnance to the Libyan people.13,14 International organizations 
and the national government’s Libyan Mine Action Center 
(LMAC) have worked together to conduct surveys, and some 
local authorities have agreed to measures to improve prac-
tices.15,16,17 Progress has been limited, however. Unstable and 
inadequately secured weapons have remained in bombed am-
munition storage areas, temporary storage facilities and mili-
tia shipping containers.
Poor stockpile management practices have abounded. Max 
Dyck, the former U.N. Mine Action Service (UNMAS) pro-
gram manager in Libya, reported in July 2012 that ammuni-
tion storage areas, littered with munitions that were kicked 
out of bunkers by NATO bombings, had no real security.5 As 
a result, civilians have had access to the weapons. Further-
more, local militias have used dangerous storage methods, 
such as keeping different types of ammunition together and 
placing stockpiles within populated areas. A reluctance to give 
up weapons acquired during the armed conflict has interfered 
with U.N. and nongovernmental organization (NGO) efforts 
to improve management practices and destroy unstable weap-
ons. In addition, funding for stockpile management initiatives 
has been insufficient, and coordination within the nation-
al government, between national and local government, and 
among the militias has been inadequate.
As a sovereign state, Libya bears the primary responsibil-
ity for dealing with its stockpiles. While it is engaged in a time 
of political transition and has many pressing concerns, Libya 
Weapons ranging from artillery shells to surface-to-air mis-
siles spill out of an ammunition bunker near Zintan that was 
bombed by NATO in 2011. These unstable and inadequately 
secured weapons exemplify the danger posed to civilians by 
Moammar Gadhafi’s abandoned ordnance months after the 
end of the armed conflict.
Photo courtesy of Nicolette Boehland.
Curious locals explore a tank yard in downtown Misrata where an Egyp-
tian migrant was gathering scrap metal. Many civilians have been killed 
or injured while harvesting scrap metal or explosives from weapons.
Photo courtesy of Bonnie Docherty.
2
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol17/iss2/2
6          editorial | the journal of ERW and mine action | summer 2013 | 17.2
should develop the national plan discussed above. In addi-
tion, it should take specific steps to reduce the humanitarian 
threats caused by poor stockpile management. For example, 
Libya should do the following:
•	 Allocate more resources to improving  
stockpile practices
•	 Increase physical security at ammunition storage areas
•	 Prioritize coordination with militias to 
move stockpiles out of populated areas 
•	 Initiate a program for building technical expertise  
within Libya
•	 Request international assistance to help put these  
steps in place
•	
Remedial Measures: Clearance, Risk Education 
and Victim Assistance
To maximize civilian protection, a trio of remedial 
measures—clearance, risk education and victim assistance—
should complement improvements in stockpile management. 
After the conflict, UNMAS and international NGOs took 
the lead on clearance efforts.18 These groups, however, have 
not received support from the Libyan government, have not 
had enough explosives to undertake controlled demolitions, 
have had difficulty finding staff with technical expertise and 
sometimes have faced obstacles when accessing sites. Groups 
have also expressed concerns about the lack of local capacity 
to take over future clearance activities.
International NGOs have played a role in risk education 
and worked closely with local risk educators. They have held 
sessions raising awareness of the dangers of abandoned ord-
nance and other ERW, distributed brochures, set up regional 
ERW-information hotlines, placed billboards on streets and 
created radio messages.19,20 Handicap International and MAG 
told the IHRC team that they have also cooperated with the 
Ministry of Education to train school teachers to provide risk 
education.21 These NGOs have received some additional as-
sistance from LMAC (part of the Army Chief of Staff’s office) 
and the Libyan Civil Defense.17,22
Risk educators have faced several challenges, including 
dangerous attitudes toward weapons, particularly among 
children; difficulties in reaching influential audiences (espe-
cially women, who play a key role in educating their families 
about ERW risks); insufficient funding and the need to in-
crease capacity in Libyan civil society to undertake further 
risk education activities.
As of July 2012, Libya had no established assistance pro-
gram dedicated to the victims of abandoned weapons and 
other ERW. However, the broader assistance program for war 
victims, which is run through the Libyan Ministry of Health, 
has helped those harmed by ERW.23 
Libya, as the affected country, bears primary responsibility 
for these remedial measures. In addition to developing a na-
tional plan, it should do the following:
•	 Increase its allocation of resources
•	 Promote capacity building and assist with the growth of 
local civil society
•	 Help deminers obtain explosives for ERW destruction 
and facilitate access to contaminated sites for clearance
•	 Ensure its victim assistance program follows inter-
national standards articulated in the Plan of Action 
on Victim Assistance under Protocol V on ERW to 
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 




The four areas discussed previously—stockpile manage-
ment, clearance, risk education and victim assistance—require 
significant resources and expertise, so international coopera-
tion and assistance is critical to protecting civilians from the 
threat of these weapons. 
As of July 2012, the international community had provid-
ed more than US$20 million to address ERW in Libya, but 
A visitor looks at the weapons on display at a war museum 
located on the main street in Misrata. Civilians may interpret 
such public displays of munitions to mean it is safe to bring 
weapons into their homes. 
Photo courtesy of Anna Crowe.
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that assistance was decreasing while the 
threats to civilians remained.25,26,27 To 
address the situation adequately, Libya 
needs increased and ongoing assistance. 
During the conflict, NATO launched 
an estimated 440 airstrikes on ammu-
nition bunkers. Rehabilitating a sin-
gle bombed-out bunker can cost more 
than US$1 million, not including secu-
rity walls, fences and lights, or clearance 
of the ordnance scattered in the attack.5 
While financial contributions are valu-
able, assistance can also come in the 
form of material or technical support. 
As a result, all states, even those with 
a limited ability to give financial assis-
tance, should be in a position to provide 
some kind of assistance.
NATO and its member states should 
accept special responsibility to provide 
cooperation and assistance to address 
the abandoned ordnance problem re-
lated to bombed ammunition bunkers. 
Although lawful, NATO airstrikes on 
the bunkers contributed to the ERW 
situation. NATO assistance would be 
consistent with the emerging princi-
ple of “making amends,” under which 
a warring party provides assistance to 
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the effects of armed conflict and spe-
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of the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
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A shipping container that was part of a militia's urban stockpile exploded in 
March 2012, setting off a chain reaction that littered a Dafniya neighborhood 
with weapons. The painted message at the site reads, “Don’t come closer—
danger, death.”
Photo courtesy of Nicolette Boehland.
civilians harmed in the course of law-
ful combat operations. Finally, such 
assistance would be consistent with 
the mandate under which NATO in-
tervened in Libya’s armed conflict: the 
protection of civilians.
Conclusion
Due to the scale of Libya’s aban-
doned ordnance situation, solving the 
problem is a monumental task. The 
weapons have already killed or injured 
civilians, and more casualties are almost 
guaranteed. Libya and the international 
community must therefore urgently de-
velop a coordinated response seeking to 
minimize this humanitarian threat. As 
a member of Libyan civil society told 
IHRC, the country needs “more cooper-
ation between all parties—all the way 
from NATO to the man who lives next 
to the abandoned ordnance.”28 If suc-
cessful, such coordinated action could 
not only reduce the loss of life in Libya, 
but also serve as a model for dealing 
with abandoned ordnance in other post-
conflict situations. 
See endnotes page 64
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